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Abstract
In Cournot’s model of complements, the producers of A and B are both monopolists.
This paper extends Cournot’s model to allow for competition between complements
on one side of the market. Consider two complements, A and B, where the A + B
bundle is valuable only when purchased together. Good A is supplied by a monopolist
(e.g., Microsoft) and there is competition in the B goods from vertically differentiated
suppliers (e.g., Intel and AMD). In this simple game, there may not be a pure-strategy
equilibria. In the standard case where marginal costs are weakly positive, there is no
pure strategy where the lower quality B firm obtains positive market share. We also
consider the case where A has negative marginal costs, as would arise when A can
expect to make upgrade sales to an installed base. When profits from the installed
base are sufficiently large, a pure strategy equilibrium exists with two B firms active in
the market. Although there is competition in the complement market, the monopoly
Firm A may earn lower profits in this environment. Consequently, A may prefer to
accept lower future profits in order to interact with a monopolist complement in B.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, an increasing number of industries have evolved from vertical
integration to more horizontal structures where firms design and manufacture components
which are later assembled by third parties for the final customer. In these horizontal indus-
tries, firms may be ‘complementors,’ rather than customers, suppliers, or competitors. The
classic pair of complementors is Intel and Microsoft. Similar complementor relationships
arise in industries ranging from communications to consumer electronics, and automobiles
to healthcare. In these industries, complementor analysis may be as important as competitor
analysis.
In his seminal book, Augustin Cournot [7, Chapter 9] introduced a model of competition
between producers of complementary goods. Using the example of copper and zinc that
is combined to make brass, Cournot showed that monopolists in each industry will divide
the profits evenly, regardless of cost differences. The applicability of Cournot’s model is
limited by the assumption that the two suppliers of complements are each monopolists. In
many horizontal industries there is competition both between complementors (Microsoft and
Intel) and also within rival complements (Intel and AMD). While price competition between
complementors and price competition between vertically differentiated goods are each well-
understood, there is no previous work on the combined case which describes the ‘competing
complements’ phenomenon.
In this paper we introduce competition into one side of the complements game. As in
Cournot [7], we consider two strictly complementary goods, A and B: the bundle A + B
is valuable, though neither A or B alone are of any value. The A good is supplied by a
monopolist while the B market is a duopoly. There is a high-quality and a low-quality
supplier of B (BH and BL, respectively). Both bundles (A, BH) and (A, BL) are valuable,
but the bundle with BH is preferred by all customers.
We illustrate this model using the pc industry. Following IBM’s decision to set up an open
standard for its Personal Computer in 1980, the microcomputer industry became gradually
more horizontal, which led to specialized players increasingly dominating each component
layer. The microprocessor and the operating system (OS) are strictly complementary in
that Intel architecture microprocessors are worthless without Windows and Windows is of
no value without microprocessors. Windows is monopolistically supplied by Microsoft; in
contrast, there is competition between Intel and AMD in the supply of microprocessors.1
For simplicity, we assume that customers all view Intel’s chips as superior.
While the model is a simple extension of Cournot, the introduction of competition from
1The model can also be flipped. We can think of Microsoft and Linux supplying rival operating systems
and Intel being the monopoly chip supplier.
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rival complements has a dramatic effect on market outcomes. Competition can create insta-
bility and surprisingly complicated interactions. When the two complements are sufficiently
similar, competition within complements breaks the existence of any pure-strategy equilib-
ria. Specifically, we show that with zero (or positive) marginal costs, there is no equilibrium
in pure strategies where BL gets positive demand. Intuitively, and in the context of our mo-
tivating example, if AMD active in the market, Intel wants to decrease its price to recover
demand lost to AMD. But if AMD is not active in the market, Microsoft is willing to raise
price, as the reduction in demand is low. With high prices from Microsoft, AMD is not a
threat to Intel, which gives Intel an incentive to raise price. But with high prices from Intel,
Microsoft then has an incentive to lower prices and bring AMD back into the market. Thus
the waltz begins once again. It is this dance between Microsoft, Intel and AMD that blocks
any pure strategy solution.
Although there is no pure strategy, we can eliminate strictly dominated strategies to
derive bounds on prices and thereby evaluate the effects of competition within complements
on profits. We confirm the intuition that competition between the B complements is good
for A when BH and BL are close in quality. This suggests that Microsoft will take action to
ensure that Intel and AMD’s products are perceived as similar by, for example, supporting
microprocessor enhancements only when offered by both Intel and AMD.
We then extend the model to consider negative marginal costs and demonstrate conditions
under which there is a pure-strategy equilibrium where BL gets positive demand (and profit).
Monopolist A could have negative marginal costs if a sale also leads to future revenue in
addition to the current price. For example, Microsoft enjoys negative marginal costs because,
in addition to making money from selling operating systems to the flow of new customers, it
anticipates future revenue from selling upgrades and applications to the installed base. Thus
each new customer creates an annuity, which is reflected in the negative cost. In contrast,
Intel and AMD’s revenue derives only from the sale of microprocessors to new customers,
not from the installed base. With negative marginal costs Microsoft is willing to set very
low prices to increase the installed base. The low prices of Microsoft induce Intel to raise its
price and this allows AMD to come in at a low price and enjoy positive demand.
Finally, we use the model to gain insight into the desirability of competition in B from
the perspective of A and from the maker of BH . Microsoft prefers the world with AMD when
customers see Intel and AMD’s microprocessors as close in quality. In this case, the strong
substitutability leads to low microprocessor prices. With low processor prices, the installed
base grows fast and Microsoft earns more money from the initial sales. The surprise arises
when Intel and AMD’s products are sufficiently vertically differentiated. Then if Microsoft
has sufficiently negative costs, Intel is better off and Microsoft worse off with AMD present.
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In the equilibrium with AMD, Microsoft sets very low prices and Intel captures more of the
pie.
1.1 Related Literature
The paper contributes to literature on ‘Co-opetition’ (Brandenburger and Nalebuff [1]) which
presents Intel and Microsoft as a motivating example on the tension between cooperation and
competition that characterizes relationships between complementors. Casadesus-Masanell
and [3] present a formal model to study the incentives of Microsoft and Intel to cooperate
and compete and show that there are significant misalignments of incentives. In particular,
Intel sets prices ‘too high,’ taking advantage of Microsoft’s willingness to price low to build
the installed base. Here, we evaluate an approach that Microsoft could follow to induce Intel
to set lower prices: encourage the development of competition in microprocessors.
Farrell and Katz [8] study innovation in a setting with a monopoly in A and a competitive
market in B. They analyze A’s incentives to enter B’s market to force suppliers of B to set
lower prices. Consistent with the motivating example, we do not allow A to enter B’s turf
(and vice versa). In addition, our setting is one with heterogeneous consumers and we focus
on pricing, not on incentives to innovate.
Cheng and Nahm [5] consider the issue of double marginalization in a pricing game with
heterogeneous consumers where products A and B need not be strict complements. In their
model, a customer can enjoy A alone, but gets an additional utility from A with B. This is
mathematically equivalent to imagining that A comes packaged with a free low-quality B;
the consumer would prefer to enjoy A with the higher quality B, but the upgrade may not
be worth the additional price. The Cheng and Nahm paper has two strategic players, the
A monopolist (who can be thought to sell an integrated product that includes a low-quality
B complement) and the high-quality B monopolist. We consider the strategic interaction
between three players, as we allow the low-quality B complement to set price and maximize
its profits. This allows us to examine the potential profits of the competing complementors
and when such competition ends up being detrimental to the A monopolist.
Another difference between our approaches is that Cheng and Nahm emphasize the Stack-
elberg pricing game, while we focus on the Nash pricing game. Furthermore, we consider the
results in the case with negative costs, which turn out to be quite different. The possibility
of negative costs naturally arises in our context due to the potential for follow-on sales to
the installed base which means that the firm can expect to make more than the current price
with the initial sale.
Chen and Nalebuff [4] study competitive interaction in markets with one-way essential
complements (A is essential to the use of B, but can be enjoyed without B). Their setting
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gives insight into competitive interactions between Microsoft and independent software ven-
dors (because the OS is essential to applications, but not the other way around) rather than
into the competition between Microsoft, Intel and AMD (because in this case both the OS
and the microprocessor are essential to one another). Just as in Farrell and Katz [8] and
Cheng and Nahm [5], Chen and Nalebuff [4] allow A to also compete in B’s market. They
show that A has an incentive to produce a competing version of B and sell it at zero price.
Moreover, when the value of B is small relative to A, then giving away B leads to the joint
monopoly outcome.
Our paper is also related to aspects of the literature on bundling (see Stigler [13] and
McAfee et al. [11]). In our setting, independent firms offer separate components but the
final customer can only enjoy the bundled product. Our model can be interpreted as one
of competition for customers by two vertically differentiated bundles with a common com-
ponent. In contrast to the question of entry deterrence, which has been the focus of much
of this literature (see Whinston [14], Choi and Stefanadis [6], Carlton and Waldman [2],
Gilbert and Riordan [10], and Nalebuff [12]), our focus is on how the pie is split between the
independent suppliers of bundle components.
2 Benchmark: Competition between Complementors
We begin by presenting the standard complementor game. Two firms m and i produce perfect
complements: the products are worthless unless used together. For most of the paper, we will
refer to firm m as Microsoft and firm i as Intel as they are the archetype of complementary
firms.2 Let q = D(pm + pi) be the demand for the bundle. Let Cj (q) = Fj + cjq, j ∈ {m, i}
be the cost to firm j of producing quantity q. Players choose prices simultaneously.
In this case, the pie is split 50:50. Profit margins are equal independent of marginal
cost differences. While this result may be surprising, the proof below follows directly from
Cournot [7].3 Formally, the result is as follows:
2In 2007, more than 80% of the personal computers worldwide shipped with an Intel microprocessor
running Microsoft’s Windows operating system. Customers to Microsoft and Intel are original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs). Pcs are commodities and OEMs have negligible pricing power. Moreover, all other
components in a pc (disk drives, monitors, memory and other chipsets) are also commodities. It is therefore
appropriate to assume that the main two strategic players affecting quantity sold of pcs are Microsoft and
Intel (q = D(pm + pi)). In fact, the combined profit of Intel and Microsoft during most years in the 1990s
exceeded the total profit of the entire world pc industry. In 2004, for example, Intel and Microsoft earned
over $15 billion in net profits while the three largest OEMs (Dell, HP and IBM) made roughly $2.5 billion
in profits from their pc operations. IBM, alone, lost over $1 billion in pcs in 1998, and another $965
million between 2001 and 2004. Only Dell made material profits in the pc industry. For more background
information on Microsoft and Intel and a detailed account of their interactions over the years see Yoffie,
Casadesus-Masanell and Mattu [15].
3As Cournot wrote: “... by the purely abstract hypothesis under consideration, the profits would be
equally divided between the two monopolists (p. 102).” He generalized the result to the case of constant
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Proposition 1 Given demand D(p) and players m and i with linear cost functions, profit
margins and variable profit (profits after accounting for fixed costs) are equal for both players.
Proof. Firm j maximizes πj = (pj − cj)D(pi + pm) − Fj , for j ∈ {m, i}. First-order
conditions are (pj − cj)D(pi + pm)′ + D(pi + pm) = 0. Therefore pm − cm = pi − ci and
(pm − cm)D = (pi − ci)D, as demand is the same for both firms.
It is surprising that a firm with high costs does just as well as one with low costs. The
intuition is that the gain from existing customers from raising price is the same for both firms
as, by definition, the demand is the same. Also, the incremental loss or gain of customers
from a price change must be the same (as customers only look at the combined price). Thus
profit margins must be the same.
At present, Intel faces significant competition from AMD and thus fits into the more
advanced case of competition between complements. But for much of the early pc period,
Intel and Microsoft were dual monopolists. Proposition 1 predicts that during this period,
the two firms would have made comparable profits on the sale of a pc. Does that accord
with the evidence?
Here, we have to be careful in interpreting the model. When a customer purchases a
pc with an Intel chip and a Microsoft OS, Intel makes all of its profits at that juncture.
In contrast, Microsoft creates an annuity where it will continue to earn money from that
customer with upgrades to a new OS and with the sale of Office. The theory predicts that
the two complementors will make the same profits when measured over the lifetime of each
pc.
Another way of seeing the equal profit result is that it is as if the two firms are engaged
in joint production where their combined costs are ci + cm. Because customers must buy the
two goods together, the firms effectively share the cost of making the two complementary
goods.
The fact that costs are split has two strategic implications. First, firms do not have
sufficient incentives to reduce their individual variable costs. The reason is that half of the
costs are effectively paid by the other complementor.
A second implication of this result is that a firm would like to treat its fixed costs as if
they were variable. While this inefficiency reduces output, that loss is second order. The
reason the firm gains is because it is able to split the “artificial” cost with its complementor.
Thus it can raise its price while the complementor lowers price. This may explain why Intel
seems to act as if some of the costs of its fab plant are variable.
costs on page 106.
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Corollary 1 To the extent that a monopoly complementor can act as if it has higher variable
costs, with log-concave demand this strategy will initially lead to increased profits.
The proof is in Appendix A.
3 Adding Competition within Complements
3.1 Motivation
We now investigate the effect on market outcomes when there is competition in one of the
complements markets. In particular, we study the game where A is a monopolist and there
are two differentiated firms in the B market.
Our motivating example is the interaction between Microsoft, Intel, and AMD. This
is just one example of a competing complements framework. We use this example as it
illustrates how the model applies to a specific industry. The application to hardware and
software also motivates the relevance of negative marginal costs (due to follow-on sales).
Microsoft is a monopolist in operating systems and there is a duopoly in microprocessors
(Intel vs. AMD).4 As it will become apparent, the game with competition in one side is
sufficiently complex that we do not attempt to solve the case with competition in both sides.
AMD was founded in 1971 with the primary mission of being a second source to In-
tel’s innovations. At the time, most customers (original equipment manufacturers) required
innovators to license their products to second sources as a condition for winning designs.
By 1976, AMD and Intel signed a broad cross-license: the deal required Intel license its
newest technology in exchange for AMD delivering technology of ‘comparable value.’ In
1985, however, Intel believed that AMD could not offer comparable value, and it abrigated
the cross-license. After a decade of litigation, Intel and AMD settled, with AMD gaining
rights to Intel’s 386 microcode in exchange for monetary compensation.
We will assume that customers view Intel’s microprocessors as offering higher perfor-
mance.5 This vertical differentiation between Intel and AMD comes from Intel’s history as
a more reliable supplier, its deeper balance sheet which offers customers a greater sense of
safety in buying from a secure supplier, and Intel’s ability to supply complementary tech-
nologies, such as chips sets, which are necessary to deliver a complete system. Yet if the
price differential is large enough, some customers will buy AMD. Because AMD is perceived
as an inferior supplier to Intel, AMD needs to set prices below Intel’s in order to generate
demand for its microprocessors.
4Alternatively, Intel could be considered a monopolist in microprocessors and Microsoft and Linux
duopolists in operating systems. However, being open source, it is questionable that Linux prices strategi-
cally. Therefore, the analysis of OS competition is simpler, but less general.
5We note that David Yoffie is a director of Intel.
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3.2 Demand
Customers are indexed by θ ∼ U [0, 1]. A customer of type θ values A + Bh at θ and values
A + Bl at fθ where 0 < f < 1.
In our context, that means the value of Microsoft Windows with AMD is a fraction f of its
value with Intel. As before, A and B are essential complements so that the value of Microsoft
alone or Intel/AMD alone is zero. Every pc has a Microsoft OS but the microprocessor may
be Intel or AMD.
Initially, we solve the model where all three firms have zero costs and then generalize the
result to include positive (and negative) costs in Section 4. We first derive demand for firms
A, Bh, and Bl, which for exposition purposes we will refer to as Microsoft, Intel and AMD.
Each firm will be denoted by its initial. Thus pa and qa refer to the price and quantity for
AMD; pi and qi apply to Intel; pm and qm apply to Microsoft.
Lemma 1 Given pm, pi, and pa, demand for AMD is the interval of line from
pi−pa
1−f down
to pa+pm
f
, assuming the interval is positive; else demand is zero. Demand for Intel is the
interval from pi−pa
1−f up to 1, assuming the interval is positive; else demand is zero. Demand
for Microsoft is the sum of the demand for AMD and Intel.
The following diagram plots the utility of customer of type θ when using an Intel+MS
bundle and an AMD+MS bundle.
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The indifferent customer is θˆ = pi−pa
1−f . Note that the diagram is for the case where
pi−pa
1−f >
pa+pm
f
. Else, Intel’s demand is based on 1− (pi + pm) and AMD gets zero demand.
In what follows we say that AMD is ‘active’ if AMD earns positive profit or is on the
margin of earning positive profit. Being on the margin of earning profits arises when AMD
is just pushed down to charging marginal cost (here 0) and the lowest value customer in
the market is just indifferent between Intel and AMD. More formally, pa = 0 and qa = 0,
but dqa/dpi > 0, so that were Intel to raise its price AMD would have positive demand. In
contrast, when AMD is not active, then at pa = 0 all customers in the market strictly prefer
Intel to AMD.
When AMD is active demand functions are:
qm = 1− pa + pm
f
, qi = 1− pi − pa
1− f and qa =
pi − pa
1− f −
pa + pm
f
.
And when AMD is not active demand functions are:
qm = qi = 1− pm − pi and qa = 0.
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3.3 Equilibrium (Non)Existence
We begin by showing that with zero costs there is no pure strategy equilibrium where AMD
gets positive demand, regardless of how close AMD and Intel microprocessors may be.
Lemma 2 With zero costs, there is no pure strategy equilibrium in which AMD obtains
positive demand.
Proof. If AMD has positive demand, Microsoft, Intel and AMD’s best responses are
pm =
f − pa
2
, (1)
pi =
1− f + pa
2
, (2)
and
pa =
fpi − (1− f) pm
2
. (3)
Substituting in (1) and (2) into (3) we get
pa =
1
4
pa.
Therefore, pa = 0. Moreover, demand for AMD is
qa =
f 1−f
2
− (1− f) f
2
f (1− f) = 0.
We conclude that in any equilibrium in which MS, Intel and AMD are all active and
choosing prices that are best-responses to each other, AMD must get zero demand. The
intuition behind this result is that Intel has a strong incentive to cut price so long as AMD
has positive share.
Given pa = 0, the reaction functions above tell us that the candidate equilibrium prices
for Microsoft and Intel are
pm =
f
2
and pi =
1− f
2
.
We now show that this candidate cannot be an equilibrium.
Proposition 2 With zero costs, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in which AMD is ac-
tive.
10
Proof. Lemma 2 has established that pa = 0; pm =
f
2
; pi =
1−f
2
is the only candidate
equilibrium in which AMD is active. Although qa = 0, AMD is active because it is on the
margin of obtaining positive demand. However, pm =
f
2
is not a best response for Microsoft.
If pi =
1−f
2
and pa = 0, Microsoft would do better to charge pm =
1+f
4
.
Microsoft raises it profits by picking its best response to Intel, ignoring the presence of
AMD. Because AMD has zero demand when Microsoft charges f
2
, AMD will also have zero
demand for any higher pm. Microsoft’s new price is higher as
1+f
4
> f
2
for f < 1.
Microsoft’s profits when pm =
f
2
, pi =
1−f
2
, and pa = 0 are πm = pm
(
1− pm
f
)
= f
4
. Mi-
crosoft’s profits when pm =
1+f
4
, pi =
1−f
2
, and pa = 0 are higher at πm = pm (1− (pi + pm)) =
(1+f)2
16
:
(1 + f)2
16
− f
4
=
(1− f)2
16
> 0
for f in [0, 1), establishing that pa = 0; pm =
f
2
; pi =
1−f
2
is not an equilibrium.
The intuition for the non-existence is as follows. With AMD in the game, Intel’s marginal
profits are discontinuous in a way that supports equilibrium. If Intel raises price, AMD takes
share away quickly, at rate 1
1−f . But if it lowers price, and AMD is squeezed out of the
market, then Intel only expands the market with Microsoft at rate 1. Thus raising price
reduces demand quickly while lowering price increases it slowly.
For Microsoft, the case is reversed. Lowering price expands demand quickly (rate 1/f)
when AMD is active (but on the margin); in contrast, raising price only slowly reduces its
joint demand with Intel (rate 1). Thus if Microsoft is indifferent about lowering price, then
it will want to raise it, and if it is indifferent about raising price, then it would want to lower
it. That explains why there is no equilibrium with AMD active in the market.
We now investigate if there is an equilibrium where AMD is not active. In this case,
Microsoft and Intel face demand 1− pm − pi and the unique candidate equilibrium is pm =
pi =
1
3
. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be that AMD cannot attract any demand
even when pa = 0. For AMD to get positive demand requires
pi−pa
1−f >
pa+pm
f
. With pi = pm
and pa = 0, AMD’s demand will be zero only if f ≤ 1/2. This is a necessary condition for
an equilibrium where AMD is not active.
At this point, we need to be careful with regard to how AMD acts in an equilibrium in
which it is not active. Since AMD’s demand is zero, there are a range of prices it could
charge, all of which lead to zero demand and zero profits. If AMD charges a high price, then
it will be less relevant when Intel and Microsoft consider alternative prices. Thus if pa is
large enough, there are pure strategy equilibria whenever f ≤ 1
2
. However, we think these
equilibria are artificial. A firm that is unable to attract customers should stand willing to
take on customers at a price equal to marginal cost.
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Assumption 1: If AMD is not active, it charges a price equal to marginal cost. Here, this
implies pa = 0.
Under Assumption 1, it turns out that a stronger condition, f ≤ 4
9
is both necessary
and sufficient for there to be a pure-strategy equilibrium where AMD is not active. We first
establish that this is sufficient.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, if f ≤ 4
9
, then there exists a unique pure-strategy
equilibrium in which Microsoft and Intel each charge 1
3
and earn 1
9
. AMD has no demand
and no effect on the market.
Proof. We know that there is no pure-strategy equilibrium in which AMD is active. If
AMD can be ignored. then the unique candidate equilibrium is the Cournot solution with
pm = pi =
1
3
. In this case, provided f ≤ 1
2
, AMD cannot achieve positive demand at pa = 0.
Thus we only need check that neither Microsoft nor Intel want to deviate. The only relevant
deviation would be to price where AMD becomes active.
Consider Intel first. Lowering price will never make AMD a factor but will decrease
Intel’s profit. Raising price sufficiently may make AMD active but that would only be worse
for Intel than its profits against Microsoft alone. Thus Intel maximizes profits at pi =
1
3
.
Consider next Microsoft. Were Microsoft to raise price, AMD will not become active.
However, were Microsoft to lower price sufficiently, AMD will have positive demand. Thus,
we have to test that Microsoft doesn’t want to price low and bring AMD into the game.
With AMD active, we know from equation (1) that Microsoft’s optimal price is pm =
f
2
and
profits are πm = pm
(
1− pm
f
)
= f
4
.6
Microsoft will not want to deviate from the proposed equilibrium provided that 1
9
≥ f
4
or f ≤ 4
9
.
The proof also demonstrates that the conditions are necessary. The requirements are
f ≤ 1
2
to ensure that AMD will not have positive demand and f ≤ 4
9
to ensure that
Microsoft will not deviate to price at f
2
. Both constraints are satisfied when f ≤ 4
9
.
Intuitively, if f is small, then AMD is not a factor as its product is not a good substitute
for Intel. Thus Microsoft will not want to pursue the undercut strategy to bring AMD in.
A corollary of our results is that when AMD microprocessors are sufficiently close in
quality to Intel’s (f > 4
9
), then there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Under Assumption 1, if 4
9
< f < 1, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium.
6This assumes that qa ≥ 0 at pa = 0, pm = f2 , and pi = 13 . This will be true provided f ≥ 13 . Thus, for
f > 49 , Microsoft will make AMD active when it prices at
f
2 .
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To see this, recall that Proposition 2 demonstrates that there cannot be a pure-strategy
equilibrium with AMD active (for any value of f). When AMD is not active, the only
potential equilibrium is pm = pi =
1
3
. As demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 3, this is
not an equilibrium when f > 4
9
. as Microsoft would deviate to f
2
from 1
3
The analysis suggests that the complementors game is intrinsically unstable. Loosely
speaking, the following ‘dynamic’ is at play. If we begin from a situation with pm = pi =
1
3
and AMD inactive, Microsoft has an incentive to lower price and bring AMD in. But once
AMD is active in the market, Intel wants to decrease its price to recover demand lost to
AMD. At the point where AMD’s demand is zero, Microsoft will choose to raise price, as
the reduction in demand is low. But then AMD is no longer a threat even on the margin,
which gives Intel an incentive to raise price. When Intel raises price, Microsoft once again
prefers to lower price to make AMD active, and the cycle begins again.
In summary, either there is no equilibrium in pure strategies (f > 4
9
) or there is an
equilibrium where AMD is irrelevant (f ≤ 4
9
). While many games do not have pure strat-
egy solutions, it would have been hard to anticipate that our simple extension of Cournot
complements would have this dynamic. From a practical point of view, the result says that
whenever it is relevant, the presence of a rival complementor causes instability in the game.
Even when there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, we can characterize the range where
prices will fall in competitive interactions between Microsoft, Intel and AMD. In Appendix
C we use the elimination of dominated strategies to derive bounds for pm, pi and pa as
functions of f). The range of undominated strategies are shown in the figure below.
One thing is apparent from this range of best responses: when f is large, Microsoft will
do well, Intel will make a small amount and AMD will get close to zero. For example, when
f = 0.9, the range of undominated prices for Microsoft is from 0.4487 to 0.4525, Intel is from
0.05 to 0.055 and AMD is from 0 to 0.0026. This is to be expected as in this case AMD is
almost a perfect substitute for Intel.7
7In the boundary case where f = 1, there is a pure-strategy equilibrium. Here, Intel and AMD’s micro-
processors are perfect substitutes so that pi = pa = 0 regardless of Microsoft’s price. Microsoft will respond
by charging pm = 12 to obtain πm =
1
4 .
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4 Adding Marginal Costs (Positive and Negative)
Now we consider marginal costs different from zero and show that a pure-strategy equilibrium
may exist when costs are negative. Let cj be firm j’s constant marginal cost. For simplicity,
we will assume that ci = ca = c. This is beneficial to AMD in that we suppose that in
practice 0 ≤ ci < ca and so this is the best case for AMD.8 Define z = cm + c. We conduct
our analysis below for all values of z, positive and negative.
Why consider negative z? We have written Microsoft’s margin as pm−cm with an implied
understanding that cm ≥ 0. But we think that it is appropriate to consider the case where
cm < 0. The motivation is that while Microsoft’s incremental cost from manufacturing
additional copies of Windows is zero, it will eventually make a stream of revenue from the
installed base. In the 1980s and early 90s, Microsoft made the stream from selling upgrades
to the operating system. More recently this revenue has come from selling upgrades to Office,
8The manufacturing process for semiconductors is highly complex. Because of this complexity, production
yields –the percentage of manufactured items that meet the necessary performance standards– are the most
significant driver of marginal costs. Yields increase significantly with experience as firms identify and resolve
trouble spots. Because Intel’s cumulative volume is larger than that of AMD, it is likely that ci < ca even
if Intel’s product is of higher quality.
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mice, financial software and more.9 Proposition 1 shows that in the two-player benchmark,
Intel makes claims to half of those negative costs. Intel gets all of those profits today while
Microsoft will get them tomorrow from the installed base of pcs.10 We will see that when
Microsoft’s marginal cost is sufficiently negative, there is an equilibrium with AMD active.11
We begin with a generalization of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 With z ≥ 0, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium with AMD active.
Proof. The proofs of all remaining propositions are in Appendix A.
When marginal costs are positive, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium where AMD
makes money. In fact, the result is slightly stronger: even if Microsoft’s costs are negative,
as long as cm ≥ −c, there is no pure-strategy equilibrium with AMD active.
Next we ask whether there is an equilibrium where AMD is not active. We have already
seen (Proposition 3) that when z = 0, there is an equilibrium where AMD is not active as
long as f ≤ 4
9
. The following proposition generalizes that result.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1 and 0 < f < 1, there is an equilibrium with AMD
inactive if and only if z ≥ z∗(f), where
z∗ (f) =
{
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) if 0 ≤ f ≤ 1
2
(
7− 3√5)
5f−6(1−f)√f
9−4f if
1
2
(
7− 3√5) < f ≤ 1
In this equilibrium
pm =
1 + 2cm − c
3
, (4)
pi =
1 + 2c− cm
3
. (5)
As before, for z ≥ 0, these equilibria arise only when f ≤ 4
9
. Higher costs z, extends the
range equilibrium where AMD is inactive. When Intel and AMD have large marginal costs,
AMD will set a relatively high price even when inactive. As a consequence, the potential
expansion in demand from having AMD in the market is modest. This makes it less attractive
for Microsoft to price low and thereby break the candidate equilibrium.
9Note that in imagining that Microsoft will earn this future revenue stream, customers are myopic in that
they do not take account of the fact that they will be paying it in the future. At the same time, they are
not taking account of the benefits that will come with those upgrades, either.
10See Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie [3] for an dynamic model where Intel makes money from the flow of
pc sales and Microsoft makes money from the flow and the installed base.
11In this development, every customer contributes equally to Microsoft’s future income (regardless of the
customer’s willingness to pay for a PC). We have also considered the case where the expected future income
depends on the incremental value of the marginal consumer and shown through examples that the main
results in sections 4 and 5 also hold. We have not characterized existence of equilibria for all values of cost
and f in this case.
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Finally, we ask whether there are combinations (z, f) such that there is a pure-strategy
equilibrium with AMD active. We know that a necessary condition is z < 0. The proposition
below shows that in this case we can always find f such that a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists with AMD active and furthermore where AMD earns positive profits.
Proposition 6 For every z < 0 there is an f such that AMD is active and earns positive
profits in equilibrium.
A necessary condition for z < 0 is cm < 0. Therefore, when z < 0, Microsoft makes
money from the installed base by selling applications and upgrades. Microsoft is willing to
give up profits today to build the installed base of PCs by setting low prices. The low prices
of Microsoft make it possible for AMD to be a viable competitor.
The surprising result is that even for z just slightly below 0, there is an f which leads
to an equilibrium where AMD is active. The reason is that at z = 0 and f = 1, we have an
equilibrium where AMD and Intel price at marginal cost. For small negative values of z, the
AMD active equilibrium exists only when f is close to 1.
The figure below shows the combinations of f and z such that AMD inactive is an
equilibrium and the combinations such that AMD active is an equilibrium. The small red
area corresponds to pairs (f, z) where there are equilibria with both AMD active and AMD
inactive. All equilibria on the yellow area have AMD active (getting positive demand and
profit). On that area, Microsoft’s marginal cost is so negative that it wants to grow the
installed base as much as possible: pm is set so low that qm = 1, hitting the boundary. The
white area are pairs (f, z) where no equilibrium (in pure strategies) exists.
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5 Comparing Equilibria
We now study how Microsoft, Intel and AMD’s profits are affected by changing z and f .
Aside from competing in setting prices, Microsoft, Intel and AMD can influence the values of
z and f . Microsoft, for example, can affect the value of z by developing new applications and
managing the pace at which the installed base becomes obsolete. Microsoft can ‘help’ AMD
raise f by contributing to AMD’s R&D efforts or by forcing Intel to license new technologies
to AMD. Likewise, Intel and AMD can affect f by investing in R&D, and z by developing
new manufacturing processes.
It is a corollary to our previous results that the equilibria are entirely characterized by z
and f .
Corollary 3 When AMD is inactive, Microsoft’s and Intel’s profits are only a function of
z. When AMD is active, the profits of all three firms are a function of z and f .
Thus changing z and f are sufficient statistics for making comparisons across equilibria.
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5.1 Choosing z (given f)
Microsoft might be better off with z close to zero so that AMD is not active even if this
means earning less from the installed base.
Proposition 7 Given f , Microsoft may prefer the equilibrium with a higher z so that AMD
is inactive in equilibrium.
The proposition is based on a comparison across equilibria. At a low value of z, the
equilibrium will include AMD, while at a higher value of z, the equilibrium will only involve
Microsoft and Intel. Microsoft may prefer to earn less future profits and interact with Intel
as a monopolist, rather than with competition.
Intuitively, when f is small, AMD’s products are perceived as far inferior. Since the
willingness to pay for AMD is very low in this case, the only possibility for AMD to be
active is if Microsoft sets very low prices so that the bundle is cheap and there are individuals
willing to buy it. When f is low, however, Microsoft may prefer larger z so that AMD is
not active. In this case, pm is higher and Microsoft makes more of its profits today. The
proposition shows, counterintuitively, that Microsoft may find it preferable to put itself at a
disadvantage (by making z closer to zero and earning less from the installed base) to make
sure that AMD is out. In other words, the absence of complement competition may result
in higher profits to Microsoft.
What if MS just charged the same price as it did when there is only Intel? Why doesn’t
that lead to higher profits? The reason is that Intel anticipates that MS will be charging a
low price and this allows Intel to charge a high price and capture more of the pie.
We now show that Intel may be better off with competition than without it.
Proposition 8 Given f , Intel always prefers z such that AMD is active in equilibrium.
There are two reasons why Intel prefers a world with competition from AMD to a situation
where it is a monopolist supplier of microprocessors. First, given f , to have an equilibrium
where AMD is active, z must be lower than what is required for an equilibrium without
AMD. Intel captures part of the additional profit generated with the lower z. Second, for
AMD to be active Microsoft must set lower prices and this benefits Intel.
5.2 Choosing f (given z)
Suppose now that z is fixed and that Microsoft can choose the degree of vertical differentiation
between Intel and AMD by, for example, doing R&D on behalf of AMD. What will it want
to choose?
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Proposition 9 Given z, Microsoft always prefers larger f .
The closer the quality of Intel and AMD microprocessors, the stronger the intensity
of price competition between them. With intense price competition in microprocessors,
Microsoft is able to raise price and earn more.
Perhaps the clearest example of Microsoft affecting f is the MMX episode in the mid-
1990s. MMX was a set of extensions in Intel’s core processors that allowed the CPU to
better handle multimedia, especially audio and video. PCs had not been designed to run
graphic-intensive games or to play music or video clips. By adding 57 new instructions to the
microprocessor, Intel wanted to increase the speed and quality of multimedia applications.
To make MMX a success, Intel spent tens of millions of dollars in R&D resources and testing
to develop the CPU extensions. In addition, it planned to spend another $250 million to
make it successful in the marketplace.12 Ultimately, however, these resources would be
wasted if Microsoft did not support Intel. If the OS was not optimized to take advantage
of MMX (Microsoft had to add one switch), then most games or other applications would
see few performance enhancements. Clearly, MMX would result in lower f unless AMD also
had access to that technology. After protracted discussions, Microsoft demanded, and Intel
acceded, to license AMD for free in exchange for Microsoft adding support for MMX.
The following proposition shows that Intel has the exact opposite preferences.
Proposition 10 Given z, Intel always prefers the lowest possible value of f .
When z is so low that the only possibility is an equilibrium with AMD active, Intel’s
pricing power is larger when f is low. In addition, the more the vertical differentiation, the
lower the price that Microsoft must set for AMD to be active and this also benefits Intel.
Moreover, when Intel and AMD’s products are highly differentiated, Intel sells larger volume.
When z is sufficiently close to zero so that for some values of f there are two-player equi-
libria and for some other values of f there are three-player equilibria, Intel still prefers small
f and AMD not active. The reason is that the fs compatible with three-player equilibria
are relatively high (f ≥ 0.568). And when f is large, price competition between AMD and
Intel is intense, making it difficult for Intel to capture value.
Consistent with the proposition, Intel has relentlessly pursued Moore’s Law throughout
its history, doubling the number of transistors on its CPU every 18 months. By increasing
wafer sizes, shrinking transistor sizes, and decreasing the time and cost of production, Intel
has managed to stay ahead of the competition. A significant percentage of Intel’s capital and
R&D spending has been pushing Intel 12-18 months ahead of AMD in process technology.
12Roughly $100 million would be dedicated to underwrite the development of new software, which could
take advantage of the new instruction set; and another $150 million to market MMX as a brand new
microprocessor that would drive consumers and business to buy new computers.
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6 Welfare
In the final section, we compare total welfare in the two- and three-player worlds. In the
equilibrium where AMD is ignored, total welfare TSAMD not active is given by:
TSAMD not active = πAMD not activem + π
AMD not active
i +
1
2
(
1− z
3
)2
=
5 (1− z)2
18
.
This is a decreasing function of z.
When AMD is active, the computation is a little bit more involved. The shaded area in
the figure below is consumer surplus in this case:
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Therefore,
TSAMD active = πAMD activem + π
AMD active
i + π
AMD active
a
+
1
2
(
3− z
6
)2
+
(
3− z
6
)(−z
6
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus of consumers buying Intel pcs
+
1
2
(−z
3f
)(−z
3
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Surplus of consumers buying AMD pcs
=
1
72
(
27− 48z + 5 (4 + f) z
2
f
)
.
The first point to notice is that TSAMD active decreases with f (as dTS
AMD active
df
= −5z
2
18f2
< 0).
There are two effects at play. First, as Intel and AMD become closer substitutes, their pricing
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power decreases and this is good for total surplus. On the other hand, the more substitutable
Intel and AMD are, the larger is Microsoft’s pricing power. The exercise of such power is
detrimental to total welfare. Notice that in the extreme case of f = 1, we have pi = pa = c
and Microsoft acts as a monopolist. This suggests that efforts by Microsoft to ‘help’ AMD
become more competitive such as, for example, financing AMD’s R&D investments, wind
up hurting total welfare.
The second result is that, from a welfare point of view, a three-player world is always
better than a world with two players. To see this, notice that given z, the worst case scenario
for TSAMD active is f = 1. Assume that f = 1 and compute TSAMD active − TSAMD not active.
It is immediate that this difference is positive for all z.
7 Concluding Remarks
We conclude with three observations:
• Managers. Competition between monopolist suppliers of complementary products re-
sults in equal profit sharing regardless of marginal cost differences. Attempts to in-
crease value capture by reducing own costs or by investing in a better product are only
50% effective as profits are split 50:50 regardless of who bears the burden. We have
shown that one way for A to increase value capture is by encouraging competition in
B. The analysis has revealed that ‘a little bit’ of competition is not enough. In fact,
mild competition between suppliers of B may be detrimental to A. The tactic works
best when competition within complements is intense.
• Welfare. Competing complements raise total surplus compared to a situation with
monopoly complements (abstracting from fixed/sunk cost considerations). However,
from a public policy viewpoint, mild competition within complements is preferable to
intense competition. When competition is intense in one side of the complements game,
the other side becomes more powerful, hurting total welfare generation. Specifically,
actions by A to help BL become closer in quality to BH appear to lower welfare.
• Literature. The paper constitutes a first step towards a general theory of competition
between and within complements. We have shown that even the simplest departure
from the standard model of monopolist complementors leads to surprisingly compli-
cated interactions and nonexistence of equilibria. There are many possible ways in
which this work can be extended but perhaps the most obvious directions are consid-
eration of horizontal differentiation between suppliers of B and having competition on
both sides of the complements game.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Corollary 1. To the extent that a monopoly complementor can act as if it has higher variable
costs, this will lead to a first-order increaser in its profits.
Proof of Corollary 1. When the firm acts as if its fixed costs are variable, it doesn’t
actually pay the higher variable costs. It only acts as if it has higher variable costs for
accounting and for pricing.
Firm i chooses pi to maximize πi = (pi − ci − f)D (pi + pm), though its actual profits
are π∗i = (pi − ci)D (pi + pm). As before, firm m maximizes πm = (pm − cm)D (pi + pm).
We have
dπ∗i
df
∣∣∣∣
f=0
=
∂π∗i
∂pi
dpi
df
+
∂π∗i
∂pm
dpm
df
+
∂π∗i
∂f
.
The first term is zero as pi was optimally chosen at f = 0. As the two goods are
complements, ∂π∗i /∂pm < 0: Intel always prefers that Microsoft charge a lower price. Finally,
∂π∗i /∂f = 0 as f does not enter into π
∗
i : Intel doesn’t really pay higher variable costs, it just
acts as if it does. Thus the effect on profits comes down to the sign of dpm/df .
Now, by an argument similar to that in the proof of Proposition 1, pi− ci− f = pm− cm.
Thus dpi/df − 1 = dpm/df . So dpm/df is negative provided dpi/df < 1. By differentiating
firm i’s first-order condition wrt f , we find that
[(pi − ci − f)D′′ + 2D′] dpi
df
−D′ = 0. (6)
The first-order condition implies
pi − ci − f = −D
D′
.
Substituting in (6), we obtain [
−D
D′
D′′ + 2D′
]
dpi
df
−D′ = 0
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or [−DD′′ + 2D′2] dpi
df
= D′2.
Thus, dpi/df < 1 provided
−DD′′ + 2D′2 > D′2
or
−DD′′ + D′2 > 0
which is equivalent to log-concavity of D. Thus, we have shown that
dπ∗i
df
∣∣∣
f=0
> 0 or that a
small increase in f leads to higher profits.
Proof of Proposition 4. If AMD is active, then Microsoft’s best response is
pm =
f + cm − pa
2
,
Intel’s best response is
pi =
1− f + c + pa
2
,
and AMD’s best response is
pa =
c + fpi − (1− f) pm
2
.
Solving the system of equations for the Nash equilibrium we obtain
pm =
3f − c (2 + f) + (4− f) cm
6
,
pi =
(3− cm) (1− f) + c (5 + f)
6
,
and
pa =
c (2 + f)− (1− f) cm
3
. (7)
Subtracting c from both sides of (7) and rearranging we obtain
pa − c = − (1− f) (c + cm)
3
Therefore, for AMD to have positive profit margin we need 0 > cm + c ≡ z. Therefore, with
z > 0 AMD loses money in the candidate Nash equilibrium. Moreover, when AMD is a
player, it gets demand
pi − pa
1− f −
pa + pm
f
. (8)
Substituting the candidate equilibrium prices and simplifying, (8) becomes
−z
3f
.
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Therefore, when z > 0 AMD gets negative demand at the candidate equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. We begin with a situation where Microsoft and Intel price against
each other ignoring AMD. For z ≥ −2, the candidate equilibrium prices in a two-player game
are
pm =
1 + 2cm − c
3
,
and
pi =
1 + 2c− cm
3
.
Profit margins are both equal to 1−z
3
. The quantity sold by both Microsoft and Intel is
1−z
3
≤ 1 and profits are each (1−z)2
9
.
For z < −2, there are multiple equilibria. In these equilibria, pi + pm = 0, so that all
customers are buying the product. For such a pair of prices to be an equilibrium, it must
be the case that neither player wants to deviate. Deviations downwards are never desirable
as volume is at its maximum. For Microsoft and Intel not to deviate upward, it must be
that raising price would lower profits, dπm/dpm ≤ 0 and dπi/dpi ≤ 0 at pi = −pm. These
conditions deliver the following inequalities:
1 + c− pm − 2pi ≤ 0 => 1 + c ≤ pi;
and
1 + cm − pi − 2pm ≤ 0 => 1 + cm ≤ −pi.
Thus the range of candidate equilibria is
1 + c ≤ pi ≤ −1− cm and pm = −pi.
For the two-player outcome to be an equilibrium, we need to ensure that AMD does not
find it profitable to enter. In the case with z < −2, note that pi ≥ 1+ c so that at pa = c, all
customers prefer AMD to Intel. The extra dollar price is not worth the extra value, even for
a customer with θ = 1 and f = 0. Since AMD can capture positive demand when pricing at
cost, we can conclude that there are no equilibria with AMD inactive for z < −2.
For z ≥ −2, Intel and Microsoft’s prices are given by (4), (5). AMD’s demand when
pricing at cost is
qa =
1 + 2z − f(2 + z)
3(−1 + f)f .
For this to be negative, we require
−1
2
< z < 1 and 0 < f < 1+2z
2+z
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or, equivalently,
0 < f < 1 and 2f−1
2−f < z. (9)
This says that given f , z cannot be too negative and that given z, f cannot be too large for
AMD’ inactive to be an equilibrium. We later show that this condition is satisfied for the
proposed set of z ≥ z∗(f).
We now consider whether Intel or Microsoft will have an incentive to deviate. As in the
model with zero costs, the presence of AMD only reduces Intel’s incentive to deviate. When
Intel considers lower prices, this will not make AMD active. Therefore demand (and profit
functions) remain unchanged and so there is no gain from lowering price. Raising price may
lead to AMD becoming active, but this would only be worse for Intel than if AMD is not
active. Without consideration of AMD, Intel did not want to raise price. Thus raising price
with AMD present can only be worse.
For Microsoft, raising price will not make AMD active. Because raising price does not
change its demand or profit function, Microsoft will not want to deviate to a higher price.
Lowering price sufficiently, however, may allow AMD to become active and this changes
Microsoft’s profits. Thus we consider potential deviations downwards by Microsoft.
By assumption, when AMD is inactive, pa = c. Assuming that the deviation leads to
AMD becoming active, Microsoft’s optimal price is
pm = max
[
−c, 1
2
(f + cm − c)
]
.
We consider each of these cases in turn. Microsoft will price at −c when z is sufficiently
negative that Microsoft will want to capture the entire market with AMD. This case arises
when z ≤ −f . Here demand is 1 and profits are −z. This deviation will not be attractive
provided
−z ≤ (1− z)
2
9
.
This implies
z ≥ 1
2
(
−7 + 3
√
5
)
≈ −0.146.
When z ≤ −f , this a necessary condition for AMD inactive to be an equilibrium. It is
also sufficient provided that AMD is truly inactive at the proposed solution. This follows as
f ≤ −z < 1+2z
2+z
for z ≥ −7+3
√
5
2
so that (9) is satisfied.
We turn now to the case where z > −f and Microsoft’s proposed deviation is to pm =
f+cm−c
2
. Microsoft’s profit margin is f−z
2
, qm =
f−z
2f
, which leads to profits of
πm =
(f − z)2
4f
.
26
We need to confirm that at the proposed deviation AMD gets positive demand. When
Microsoft lowers its price, the demand for AMD is
qa =
3z − f(−1 + 3f + z)
6(−1 + f)f .
Thus qa > 0 implies
z <
−f (1− 3f)
3− f . (10)
We assume this is satisfied and show below that this is indeed the case.
For Microsoft not to deviate to this low price requires that it lead to lower profits:
(f − z)2
4f
≤ (1− z)
2
9
. (11)
With a little bit of algebra, this condition reduces to
5f − 6 (1− f)√f
9− 4f ≤ z ≤
5f + 6 (1− f)√f
9− 4f
To show that this is a necessary condition, note that for z < 5f−6(1−f)
√
f
9−4f it also follows
(with some algebra) that z < −f(1−3f)
3−f so that AMD obtains positive demand and Microsoft
higher profits at the proposed deviation.
To show that this is a sufficient condition, we know that there is no profitable deviation
for Microsoft. Thus we only need confirm that AMD does not obtain any demand in the
proposed equilibrium. Again, with some algebra, it follows that z ≥ 5f−6(1−f)
√
f
9−4f implies
z > 2f−1
2−f .
It only remains to link together the two cases, z ≤ −f and z > −f . Obviously, z =
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) and z = −f intersect at f = 1
2
(
7− 3√5). This also happens to be the f
where z = 5f−6(1−f)
√
f
9−4f has its minimum, which is
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) . Thus the two conditions fit
together to become:
z ≥ z∗(f) =
{
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) if 0 ≤ f ≤ 1
2
(
7− 3√5)
5f−6(1−f)√f
9−4f if
1
2
(
7− 3√5) < f ≤ 1
The region where Microsoft does not want to deviate is shown in the following figure:
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Proof of Proposition 6. When AMD is active profit functions are:
πm = (pm − cm)
(
1− pa + pm
f
)
,
πi = (pi − c)
(
1− pi − pa
1− f
)
,
and
πa = (pa − c)
(
pi − pa
1− f −
pa + pm
f
)
.
Solving the system of FOCs we obtain a unique candidate to Nash equilibrium:
pm =
3f − c (2 + f) + (4− f) cm
6
, (12)
pi =
(3− cm) (1− f) + c (5 + f)
6
, (13)
and
pa =
c (2 + f)− (1− f) cm
3
. (14)
We know from Proposition 5 that for there to be a pure-strategy equilibrium with AMD
active, it must be that z < 0. When z < 0, quantities at the candidate equilibrium prices
are all positive:
qm =
1
6
(
3− (2 + f) z
f
)
,
qi =
3− z
6
,
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and
qa =
−z
3f
.
In computing the candidate to equilibrium we have assumed that qm < 1. When z is
very negative, however, qm =
1
6
(
3− (2+f)z
f
)
> 1 and thus the above solution does not apply.
The condition on z that guarantees that qm < 1 is:
z > − 3f
2 + f
. (15)
When (15) is satisfied, (12), (13), and (14) is the unique candidate to Nash equilibrium.
Below we derive additional conditions on z and f that guarantee that that candidate is
indeed an equilibrium.
In the case where z < − 3f
2+f
there are multiple candidate equilibria. In all of these
solutions the large negative costs lead to pm + pa = 0 and so the entire market will be
served. Because AMD will never set pa to be less than zero, the candidates must satisfy
pm = −pa ≤ 0. Moreover, for pm to be part of an equilibrium, we need the derivative of πm
with respect to pm evaluated at pm = −pa to be less than zero (weakly) so that Microsoft has
no incentive to raise prices. Note that Microsoft will never want to deviate down because
volume cannot be increased. Furthermore, AMD is already a player. Therefore,
dπm
dpm
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ f + cm − pa − 2pm
f
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ pa ≤ −f − cm
For pa to be part of an equilibrium we need to ensure that AMD does not want to raise
price from pa = −pm. Thus,
dπa
dpa
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ −fpi − (1− f) pm + c− 2pa
f (1− f)
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ pa ≥ fpi + c
1 + f
. (16)
We also must make sure that AMD does not want to deviate down. While lowering price
will not expand total demand, it will result in larger market share for AMD, as the lower
prices will persuade some Intel customers to switch to AMD. The first other condition that
we must consider for price decreases is derived as follows:
When the market is covered, qa =
pi−pa
1−f and πa = (pa − c) pi−pa1−f . Therefore, AMD will
not want to lower price if the following is satisfied:
− dπa
dpa
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ − pi + c− 2pa
1− f
∣∣∣∣
pm=−pa
≤ 0 ⇒ pa ≤ pi + c
2
. (17)
Intel is not at the boundary and thus its first-order condition will be satisfied with
equality: pi =
1−f+pa+c
2
. Substituting this into (16) leads to
pa − c ≥ f (1− f)
2 + f
.
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And substituting into (17) leads to
pa − c ≤ 1− f
3
.
Let d ≡ pa − c and recall that z ≡ cm + c. Our range of potential equilibria with AMD
active is
f (1− f)
2 + f
≤ d ≤ −f − z (18)
and
d ≤ 1− f
3
. (19)
Finally, we must worry about ‘non marginal’ deviations: Microsoft significantly raising
pm and moving to a solution where AMD is inactive. Absent a deviation, Microsoft’s profits
are
πm = (pm − cm) ∗ 1 = −pa − cm. (20)
If Microsoft were to deviate, it would be to pm =
1+cm−pi
2
. In that event,
pm − cm = 1− 2cm − c + f − pa
4
.
Adding and subtracting c from the numerator, gross margin can be expressed as
pm − cm = 1− 2cm − 2c + f − (pa − c)
4
=
1− 2z + f − d
4
,
and Microsoft’s profits are
(pm − cm)2 = (1− 2z + f − d)
2
16
. (21)
For AMD active to be an equilibrium, we need to demonstrate that (20) is larger than
(21) over the range given by (18) and (19). That is, we need
−d− z ≥ (1− 2z + f − d)
2
16
(22)
over
f (1− f)
2 + f
≤ d ≤ −f − z and d ≤ 1− f
3
.
It is easy to see that (22) simplifies to
0 ≤ d ≤ −7− 2z + f + 4
√
3 + z − f . (23)
There is one more issue that we must take into account in characterizing the combinations
f and z that are consistent with equilibria. This is that the only non-marginal deviations
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allowed are increases in price. A non-marginal deviation by Microsoft that involves a reduc-
tion in price will not result in volume increases as q is already at its maximum. Therefore,
a reduction in price can only lead to lower profits.
When Microsoft deviates to ignore AMD it sets price pˆm =
1+cm−pi
2
. Intel is at its reaction
function (as if AMD was active) pi =
1−f+pa+c
2
. Substituting in, we obtain
pˆm =
1 + f − 2c + 2cm − d
4
.
Now, because the only non-marginal deviations allowed are increases in price, whenever z,
f , and d satisfying (15), (18), and (19) are such that pˆm ≤ pm, we must be at an equilibrium
(even if (23) is violated)13. Therefore, the condition is
1 + f − 2c + 2cm − d
4
≤ −pa
1 + f − 2c + 2cm − d
4
+ c ≤ −pa + c
or
−1 + f + 2z
3
≥ d. (24)
With all this preamble, we now present the combinations z and f such that equilibria
exist. We proceed in two steps. First we show the pairs (z, f) such that (18), (19), and
(24) are satisfied. The only condition that we are not imposing in the first step is the profit
condition (23). All pairs satisfying (18), (19), and (24) are part of an equilibrium even if
the profit condition is violated because larger profits (violation of (23)) must come from a
disallowed price move, a move down. The second step is to impose the profit condition. Pairs
that violate (24) will be part of equilibria if (23) is satisfied.
Step 1 : A little algebra reveals that z, f , and d satisfying (18), (19), and (24) are the
following.
• z ≤ −1, 0 ≤ f < 1, and f(1−f)
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
• −1 < z ≤ −1
2
, 0 ≤ f < 3+z
2
− 1
2
√
13 + 14z + z2, and f(1−f)
2+f
≤ d ≤ −1−f−2z
3
.
• −1 < z ≤ −1
2
, f = 3+z
2
− 1
2
√
13 + 14z + z2, and d = −1−f−2z
3
.
The following figure shows the area (on (f , z) space).
13The equilibrium has pm = −d− c, pa = −pm, and pi = 1−f+pa+c2 .
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Step 2 : Using Mathematica, we obtain z, f , and d satisfying (18), (19), and (23).
Let w1(z) be the second root of the following polynomial:
1 + 12z + 4z2 +
(
10 + 10z + 4z2
)
x +
(−1− 2z + z2)x2 +−2 (1 + z) x3 + x4.
Let w2 ≈ −.899 be the second root of the following polynomial:
857 + 1260x + 366x2 + 28x3 + x4.
Let w3 ≈ −.506 be the third root of the following polynomial:
13 + 31x + 11x2 + x3.
Let w4 ≈ −.184 be the first root of the following polynomial:
9 + 51x + 11x2 + x3.
The answer is:
• When 1
2
(−3− 2√2) < z ≤ 1
3
(−5− 2√3), we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < w1(z) and
f−f2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
• When 1
3
(−5− 2√3) < z < −1, we have
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– f = 0 and 0 < d ≤ 1
3
.
– 0 < f < 3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– f = 3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < 1−f
3
.
– 3
2
√−1− 2z+ 1
2
(2 + 3z) < f < w1(z) and
f−f2
2+f
≤ d < −7+ f −2z+4√3− f + z.
• When z = −1, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d ≤ 1
3
.
– 0 < f < 1 and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
• When −1 < z < w2, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d ≤ 1
3
.
– 0 < f ≤ 1
2
(−1− 3z) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(−1− 3z) < f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
• When w2 < z < 13
(−5 + 2√3), we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d ≤ 1
3
.
– 0 < f < 1
2
(−1− 3z) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(−1− 3z) ≤ f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
• When z = 1
3
(−5 + 2√3), we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < 1
3
.
– 0 < f ≤ 1
2
(
4− 2√3) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(
4− 2√3) < f < − 2((−5+2√3))
3(3+ 13(−5+2
√
3))
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1
3
(
5− 2√3)− f .
• When 1
3
(−5 + 2√3) < z < w3, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
– f = −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < 1−f
3
.
– −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) < f < 1
2
(−1− 3z) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(−1− 3z) ≤ f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
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• When f = w3, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
– f = −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < 1−f
3
.
– −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) < f ≤ 1
2
(−1− 3z) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(−1− 3z) < f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
• When w3 < z < −12 , we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
– f = −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < 1−f
3
.
– −3
2
√−1− 2z + 1
2
(2 + 3z) < f < 1
2
(−1− 3z) and f−f2
2+f
≤ d ≤ 1−f
3
.
– 1
2
(−1− 3z) ≤ f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
• When −1
2
< z < w4, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < −√2√1 + z + 3+z
2
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
– f = −√2√1 + z + 3+z
2
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
– −√2√1 + z + 3+z
2
< f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d ≤ −f − z.
• When z = w4, we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < −2z
3+z
and f−f
2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
• When w4 < z < 12
(−3 + 2√2), we have
– f = 0 and 0 < d < −7− 2z + 4√3 + z.
– 0 < f < w1(z) and
f−f2
2+f
≤ d < −7 + f − 2z + 4√3− f + z.
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The following figure shows the area (on (f , z) space).
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Finally, we put both areas together to find all the pairs (z, f) where an equilibrium exists.
0 1
-1
-½
z
f 22321 
 22321 
The non-intersecting pairs are those on the yellow and green areas. On the yellow area,
deviations by Microsoft to ignore AMD lead involve larger prices there. However, the profit
condition (23) is satisfied. Therefore, Microsoft is better off not deviating and keeping AMD
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in. On the green area the profit condition does not hold but deviations are to lower prices.
Since volume can never be larger that 1, Microsoft will prefer not to deviate. Therefore, the
green area also corresponds to equilibria.
Let w ≈ 0.1304 be the first root of −1 + 7x + 5x2 + x3 = 0. We conclude that there are
equilibria with q = 1 and AMD active whenever z is below the following line (this is the
upper bound of the yellow area):{
−3 + f + 3
2+f
+
2
√
(1−f)(2+f)2
(2+f)2
if 0 ≤ f ≤ w
−3f
2+f
if w < f < 1
.
We now study the case where (15) is satisfied. As mentioned above, (12), (13), and (14)
is the unique candidate to Nash equilibrium. Profit margins (at the candidate equilibrium
prices) are all positive
pm − cm = 1
6
(3f − (2 + f) z) ,
pi − c = (−1 + f) (−3 + z)
6
,
and
pa − c = (−1 + f) z
3
.
Finally, profits (at the candidate equilibrium prices) are
πm =
(f (z − 3) + 2z)2
36f
, (25)
πi =
(1− f) (3− z)2
36
, (26)
and
πa =
(1− f) z2
9f
.
For (12), (13), and (14) to constitute an equilibrium, we need to check that there is no
profitable deviation. In particular, we need to check that Microsoft does not want to price
higher to move to a duopoly. (No need to check that Intel does not want to price lower to
get rid of AMD. Lowering price when AMD is present is more effective than when AMD is
not there.)
Assume that Intel and AMD stay put at the prices given by (13) and (14). Microsoft’s
best response function when pricing against Intel alone is pm =
1
2
(1− pi + cm). Its demand
is qm = 1− (pm + pi). Substituting, we see that MS’s profit from the deviation is
πm =
1
144
(3 + 3f − (5 + f)z)2 . (27)
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Microsoft will not deviate if (25) is larger than (27). Manipulating the inequality, the
condition on z that guarantees that the three-player equilibrium is not broken by Microsoft
(by pricing high) is
z ≤ −12
√
f + 3f(3 + f)
16 + f(7 + f)
= z∗ (f) . (28)
Pairs (f, z) below z∗ (f) are such that Microsoft does not want to deviate upwards. To
find the pairs (z, f) where the equilibrium is given by prices (12), (13), and (14), we must
impose that z > − 3f
2+f
. When z is too negative the condition is violated. We conclude that
the pairs (z, f) where (12), (13), and (14) are the equilibrium prices are those that satisfy:
− 3f
2 + f
< z ≤ −12
√
f + 3f(3 + f)
16 + f(7 + f)
and w < f < 1,
where w is the first root of −1 + 7x + 5x2 + x3 = 0 (w ≈ 0.1304).
Finally, we need to check that when Microsoft desires to deviate, AMD gets negative
demand, so that the relevant demand function faced by Microsoft when deviating is 1 −
(pm + pi). AMD’s demand at the deviation becomes
qa =
pi − pa
1− f −
pa + pm
f
= −3− 3f + (3 + f)z
12f
.
Notice that large z makes this expression negative. Substituting (28) we see that qa is
negative at the critical z. Therefore at any z such that Microsoft deviates (z larger than eq.
28), AMD gets negative demand.
Finally we put it all together in one single graph:
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Proof of Proposition 7. Microsoft’s equilibrium profits when AMD is active are
πAMD activem =
(f (z − 3) + 2z)2
36f
.
Differentiating πAMD activem with respect to z and considering that z must be negative for
AMD to be active, we see that Microsoft’s profits increase as z becomes more negative.
The best-case scenario in a three-player world is that z takes value − 3f
2+f
, the lower bound
derived in the proof of Proposition 6. Substituting into πAMD activem and simplifying we obtain
πAMD activem = f . That is, given f , Microsoft’s maximum profit in a world with AMD active
is f (assuming that − 3f
2+f
≤ z < −12
√
f+3f(3+f)
16+f(7+f)
).
We turn now to Microsoft’s profits in a two-player world. As shown above, we have
πAMD not activem =
(1− z)2
9
.
Clearly, πAMD not activem decreases with z. Therefore, if Microsoft was allowed to choose z
within the set of zs compatible with a two-player equilibrium, it would choose the lowest
possible z. As shown in the proof of Proposition 5, the lower bound is given by
z =
{
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) if 0 ≤ f ≤ 1
2
(
7− 3√5)
5f−6(1−f)√f
9−4f if
1
2
(
7− 3√5) < f ≤ 1 .
Substituting in πAMD not activem , we find Microsoft’s maximum profits in a two player world.
Finally, we compare πAMD activem and π
AMD not active
m .
The profits are equal at f = 1
2
(
7− 3√5). Thus for any lower value of f , it is possible for
Microsoft to earn more by increasing its costs and thereby moving to a duopoly equilibrium
with Intel. We know from Proposition 6 that the three-firm equilibrium only exists if f ≥
w ≈ 0.1304.. 14
Proof of Proposition 8. When AMD is active, Intel’s equilibrium profits are
πAMD activei =
(1− f) (z − 3)2
36
.
Because z < 0, πAMD activei decreases with z. The worst-case scenario for Intel in a three-
player world occurs when z takes the maximum value compatible with a three-player world:
14Notice that although the range of f for which the proposition applies is small (0.1304 ≤ f < 0.1459),
we have set a very demanding benchmark against which to compare πAMD not activem . In assuming that
Microsoft can choose any z, we are allowing for very high πAMD activem . In reality, there are constrains that
prevent Microsoft from going all the way to z = − 3f2+f . For example, the prices of applications and other
products sold to the installed base are bounded by competitors’ offerings. This means that πAMD activem is
likely to be lower than what we have considered in the proof. Therefore, we expect the range of f for which
πAMD not activem > π
AMD active
m to be larger and the proposition to apply more generally.
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z = −12
√
f+3f(3+f)
16+f(7+f)
. Profits in this case are
πAMD activei = 4 (1− f)
(
4 + f +
√
f
16 + f (7 + f)
)2
.
When AMD is not active, Intel’s profits are
πAMD not activei =
(1− z)2
9
,
a decreasing function of z. If Intel was allowed to choose z within the set of zs compatible
with a two-player equilibrium, it would choose the lowest possible z:
z =
{
1
2
(−7 + 3√5) if 0 ≤ f ≤ 1
2
(
7− 3√5)
5f−6(1−f)√f
9−4f if
1
2
(
7− 3√5) < f ≤ 1 .
Substituting in πAMD not activei , we find Microsoft’s maximum profits in a two player world.
Finally, we compare πAMD activei and π
AMD not active
i . A little algebra reveals that π
AMD not active
i <
πAMD activei always.
Proof of Proposition 9. If z is positive (two-player world), f has no effect on Microsoft’s
profit and thus Microsoft is indifferent. If z is negative we may be in a two-player or a
three-player world. Once again, Microsoft’s profits (πm =
(1−z)2
9
) are independent of f in the
two-player equilibrium. With three players, however, πm depends on f : πm =
(f(z−3)+2z)2
36f
.
Differentiating πm with respect to f , we obtain
dπm
df
= 1
36
(−2z − 3f + zf) 2z−3f+zf
f2
. Because
2z − 3f + zf < 0, if we show that −2z − 3f + zf < 0 we will conclude that larger f is
better for Microsoft. Notice that −2z − 3f + zf is largest when z is as negative as possible
(because 2 > f). The smallest possible z is z = −3f
2+f
. Substituting into −2z − 3f + zf we
obtain − 6f2
f+2
which is less than zero. Therefore, dπm
df
> 0.
Finally, we ask: Given 3
√
5−7
2
≤ z < 0 so that both, two-player and three-player equilibria,
are possible (depending on the value of f) what is f that maximizes Microsoft’s profit? We
compare πm =
(1−z)2
9
and πm =
(f(z−3)+2z)2
36f
evaluated at f = 1. Clearly the three-player
world is better to Microsoft.
Proof of Proposition 10. We look at the case with z < 0 because Intel’s profits are
independent of f when z > 0. When z < 3
√
5−7
2
, the only possible equilibrium is a situation
with AMD active. In this case, profits are πAMD activei =
(1−f)(3−z)2
36
a decreasing function
of f . Therefore, the profit-maximizing f (in a three-player world) is the smallest f that is
compatible with AMD active.
Finally, we need to check that when both two and three player equilibria are possible
(3
√
5−7
2
≤ z < 0), Intel prefers the smaller f that makes AMD inactive. In the two-player
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equilibrium, Intel earns πAMD not activei =
(1−z)2
9
. The smallest z such that both two and three
player equilibria are possible is z = 3
√
5−7
2
. With this, we can easily compute the smallest f
such that both two and three player equilibria are possible: f =
−61+36√5+3
q
31(−17+8
√
5)
62
≈
0.568. Whenever z > 3
√
5−7
2
, the best f for Intel is given by
9+18z−7z2+
√
−3(z−3)3(1+5z)
2(z−3)2 (we
computed this by solving (28) for f – considering those f larger than 0.568 only). We now
substitute the “best f” in πAMD activei =
(1−f)(3−z)2
36
and compare the result to πAMD not activei =
(1−z)2
9
(under the constraint that 3
√
5−7
2
≤ z < 0). A little algebra shows that πAMD activei <
πAMD not activei . Therefore Intel will want to choose f low enough to make sure that AMD is
not active.
Proof of Proposition ??. AMD is active in equilibrium only when z is negative and
f ≥ 0.1304. In the three-player world, AMD’s profits are:
πa =
(1− f) z2
f
.
This function is decreasing in f .
B Deriving the Best Response Functions
The first step it to derive best response functions of Microsoft, Intel, and AMD. This provides
additional insight into the non-existence result in Corollary 2.
B.1 Microsoft’s Best Response
Microsoft may ignore AMD or price assuming that AMD will be active. When Intel prices
low, MS prices against Intel only. When Intel’s price is high, MS prices against both Intel
and AMD.
• If Microsoft ignores AMD and just prices against Intel, demand is qm = 1 − pm − pi.
The best response function is pm =
1
2
(1− pi). Profits are πm = 14 (1− pi)2.
• If Microsoft prices assuming that AMD will be a factor, demand is qm = 1 − pa+pmf .
The best response function is pm =
1
2
(f − pa). Profits are πm = (f−pa)
2
4f
.
Two-player world is better than three-player world to Microsoft if
1
4
(1− pi)2 ≥ (f − pa)
2
4f
. (29)
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Taking into account that 0 ≤ pa < f , condition (29) is equivalent to
pi ≤ 1− f − pa√
f
.
Therefore, MS’s best response function is:
Rm (pi, pa; f) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(1− pi) if 0 ≤ pi < 1− f−pa√f
pm ∈
{
f−pa
2
√
f
, 1
2
(f − pa)
}
if pi = 1− f−pa√f
1
2
(f − pa) if 1− f−pa√f < pi ≤ 12
.
Notice that 1− f−pa√
f
is always greater than zero but may be larger than 1
2
in which case MS
prices against Intel (regardless of the price set by Intel). The condition for Rm to have a
portion where MS prices against AMD is
1
8
(
1 + 8pa +
√
1 + 16pa
)
≤ f.
Clearly, when f is small AMD is ignored.
The following is a plot of Rm (pi, pm; f). The blue reaction function is for pa =p
¯
a = 0.
The red function is for pa =p¯a > 0. (We use the notation p¯ and p
¯
for highest and lowest
prices.) Of course, there is a continuum of reaction functions comprised between the blue
and the red reaction functions in the figure below.
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B.2 AMD’s Best Response
We assume that AMD charges zero at the lowest. When MS charges high and Intel low, this
is AMD’s best response. It is important that AMD gets zero demand for AMD to wish to
charge zero. We will need to check that AMD’s demand is zero when Intel and Microsoft
charge, respectively, p
¯
i and p¯m. That is, we need
p¯m
f
≥ p¯i
1− f .
We will show below that this is true.
When AMD gets positive demand ( pi
1−f − pmf ≥ 0), profits are πa = pa
(
pi−pa
1−f − pa+pmf
)
.
AMD’s best response is pa =
1
2
(fpi − (1− f) pm). Therefore,
Ra (pm, pi; f) =
{
1
2
(fpi − (1− f) pm) if pi1−f − pmf ≥ 0
0 otherwise
.
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The largest price AMD will ever charge occurs when Intel charges the highest price and
Microsoft the lowest:
p¯a =
1
2
(
f p¯i − (1− f) p
¯m
)
.
We are assuming that in this case demand for AMD is positive.
B.3 Intel’s Best Response
Intel can ignore AMD and just price against MS or assume that AMD will be active.
• Ignoring AMD, Intel faces demand qi = 1 − (pm + pi). The best response is pi =
1
2
(1− pm) and profits are πi = 14 (1− pm)2.
• Assuming that AMD will be a factor, demand is qi = 1− pi−pa1−f . The best response is
pi =
1
2
(1− f + pa) and profits are πi = (1−f+pa)
2
4(1−f) .
• There is a corner solution also. If Intel ignores AMD it would choose to price high,
so high that AMD becomes a factor. In that case, Intel would choose to price high,
so high that AMD becomes a factor. In that case, Intel would like to lower its price
(because it gains customers at rate 1/ (1− f) rather than at rate 1).
However, once Intel’s price falls to the point that AMD gets zero demand, then Intel is
back to pricing against Microsoft, which would lead it to raise price. But raising price
makes AMD a factor again. Thus, Intel ends up at a corner solution where AMD is
just excluded from the market.
At the corner solution, pi is such that qa = 0. Thus, pi =
pa+(1−f)pm
f
. Intel faces
demand qi = 1− (pm + pi) or qi = 1− pi−pa1−f . Profits are πi = (f−pm−pa)(pa+(1−f)pm)f2 .
Let’s now find the domains where each of these three best responses are relevant. In a
two-player world Intel charges pi =
1
2
(1− pm). AMD’s demand is qa = pi−pa1−f − pa+pmf . If we
substitute pi and solve qa = 0, we obtain
pm =
f − 2pa
2− f . (30)
This is Microsoft’s price (as a function of pa) such that Intel switches from pricing against
MS to the corner solution.
In a three-player world Intel charges pi =
1
2
(1− f + pa). Substituting in qa and solving
qa = 0 for pm, we obtain
pm =
1
2
(
f − (2− f) pa
1− f
)
. (31)
It is easy to see that (30) is always larger than (31).
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Intel’s reaction function is then:
Ri (pm, pa; f) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2
(1− f + pa) if pm ≤ 12
(
f − (2−f)pa
1−f
)
pa+(1−f)pm
f
if 1
2
(
f − (2−f)pa
1−f
)
≤ pm < f−2pa2−f
1
2
(1− pm) if f−2pa2−f ≤ pm ≤ 12
.
This looks as follows (this figure is for the case where 1
2
(
f − (2−f)pa
1−f
)
> 0 and f−2pa
2−f <
1
2
):
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B.4 Equilibrium non-existence (revisited)
Now that we have derived Microsoft and Intel’s reaction functions, we can put them in one
single plot and see that when f > 4
9
, there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. The following
plot is for f = 1
2
and pa ∈
[
0, 1
34
]
.
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C Obtaining Price Bounds
Having obtained the best response functions, we now proceed to eliminating dominated
strategies. We consider the case f ≥ 4
9
.
C.1 p
¯
m
We obtain p
¯
m by inspection of Rm (pi, pa; f). Throughout the analysis, we will assume that
1−√f + p¯a√
f
≤ p¯i. We will later show that the condition is satisfied. With this, the lowest
price for Microsoft occurs when pa is maximum. That is
p
¯m
=
1
2
(f − p¯a) .
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C.2 p
¯
i and p¯m
The figure above (Section B.4) reveals that p
¯
i and p¯m are jointly determined. Inspecting the
figure, we see that
p
¯i
=
{
1−p¯m
2
if f < p¯m and
f
2−f < p¯m
1−f
2
if f ≥ p¯m or f2−f ≥ p¯m
.
Now, because f
2−f < f , we have
p
¯i
=
{ 1−p¯m
2
if f < p¯m
1−f
2
if f ≥ p¯m
.
Substituting this expression into p¯m (assuming that p
¯
i ≤ 1−
√
f) we obtain
p¯m =
{
1− 1−p¯m
2
2
if f < p¯m
1+f
4
if f ≥ p¯m
.
Therefore, if f < p¯m, we have
p¯m =
1− 1−p¯m
2
2
⇒ p¯m =
1
3
.
Thus
p¯m =
{
1
3
if f < 1
3
1+f
4
if f ≥ 1
3
and
p
¯i
=
{
1
3
if f < 1
3
1−f
2
if f ≥ 1
3
.
It is easy to see that p
¯
i ≤ 1 −
√
f for all f and our assumption is correct. In addition to
p
¯
i ≤ 1−
√
f we have also assumed that p
¯
a = 0 (for all f). In the next subsection we show
that the guess is correct.
Since we are interested in the case f > 4
9
, in what follows we consider the simpler
expressions p¯m =
1+f
4
and p
¯
i =
1−f
2
.
C.3 p
¯
a
We have assumed that p
¯
a = 0 for all f . We now show that this is true. We plug p
¯
i and p¯m
in
qa =
pi − pa
1− f −
pa + pm
f
to obtain
qa = −(1− f)
2 + 4pa
4 (1− f) f < 0.
With this, we confirm that p
¯
a = 0.
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C.4 p¯i
We have just shown that
p¯m =
1 + f
4
.
We also know that
p
¯m
=
1
2
(f − p¯a) .
Notice that p
¯
m is largest when p¯a = 0. (We use this fact below.) Now, we consider p¯m and
p
¯
m in deriving p¯i.
When f is large, the peak of the mountain on Intel’s reaction function is at pm to the
right of p¯m. The critical f such that below it the peak is to the left of p¯m is found by solving
f − 2p¯a
2− f =
1 + f
4
.
The solution is
f ∗ = 1
2
(
−3 +√17 + 32p¯a) .
Therefore, when f ≥ f ∗, p¯i is on the upward sloping portion of Intel’s reaction function and
p¯i =
p¯a + (1− f) 1+f4
f
.
As long as f ≥ 1
4
, the peak is attained at pm strictly between p¯m and p
¯
m. In this case
p¯i =
1− f + p¯a
2− f .
To summarize,
p¯i =
{
1−f+p¯a
2−f if f ≤ 12 (−3 +
√
17 + 32p¯a)
p¯a+(1−f) 1+f4
f
if 1
2
(−3 +√17 + 32p¯a) < f
.
C.5 p¯a
We now look for p¯a as a function of f only. To do this, we put the highest price for Intel
and the lowest for Microsoft in AMD’s reaction function and then we solve for p¯a (Intel’s
highest price and Microsoft’s lowest price depend on p¯a)
p¯a =
1
2
(
f p¯i − (1− f) p
¯m
)
.
We obtain the following expression. Let w2 solve −6 + 9x + x3 = 0 (w2 ≈ 0.63783). Then
p¯a =
{
f2−f3
6−3f−f2 f < w2
1−2f+f2
2(1+f)
if w2 ≤ f < 1
.
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C.6 p
¯
m revisited
We have shown above that
p
¯m
=
1
2
(f − p¯a) .
Substituting p¯a we obtain p
¯
m as a function of f .
p
¯m
=
{
f(3−2f)
6−f(3+f) if f < w2
f(4+f)−1
4(1+f)
if w2 ≤ f < 1
.
C.7 p¯i revisited
We have shown that
p¯i =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
2
(
1− f−2p¯a
2−f
)
if f ≤ 1
2
(−3 +√17 + 32p¯a)
p¯a+(1−f) 1+f4
f
if 1
2
(−3 +√17 + 32p¯a) < f
.
Substituting p¯a we obtain p¯i as a function of f :
p¯i =
{ 3(1−f)
6−f(3+f) if f < w2
(1−f)(3+f2)
4f(1+f)
if w2 ≤ f < 1
.
C.8 Checking that 1−√f + p¯a√
f
≤ p¯i
Plotting both sides of the inequality it is easy to see that the condition is satisfied.
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